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TAXATION
I. Ixcom TAx - NoNPRonTr OXGANZATioN Ex 0riox
In Elmwood Cemetery Association v. South Carolina TaW
Commission,' Elmwood Cemetery, which was chartered as an
eleemosynary corporation, brought an action against the South
Carolina Tax Commission for a judgment declaring that the
Association was exempt from the payment of income taxes by
statute2 and restraining the Commission from assessing or at-
tempting to collect any tax from it. The Tax Commission con-
tended that the action could not be maintained because of the
rule of sovereign immunity and, furthermore, because the action
was not authorized by the provisions of the taxing statutes.8
The court accepted the Tax Commission's contention and held
that the only remedy provided by statute4 is the payment of the
tax under protest, whether such tax is legally due or not, fol-
lowed by a suit at law for recovery of this amount. The court
said that the exclusiveness of this statutory remedy is provided
by law5 and its adequacy has been frequently decided.6
II. IxcomE TAX - W EN INcom Is TAxABLE
In Woodward v. outAh Carolina Tax Commission7 the court
decided that the gain from the sale of land is taxable in the
year in which the deed and mortgage are delivered into escrow.8
Elizabeth Woodward9 entered into an agreement for the sale
of land wherein she agreed to execute a deed and take a mortgage
as security for the purchase price. The consideration was agreed
upon as $1000 per acre with an estimated 500 acres in the tract.
1. 253 S.C. 76, 169 S.E2d 148 (1969).
2. S.C. CODE ANN. § 65-226(3) (1962) provides in part that cemetery
corporations and corporations organized for religious, charitable, or educational
purposes shall be exempt from taxes under this chapter.
3. S.C. CODE ANN. § 65-2655 (1962).
4. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 65-2661, -2662 (1962).
5. S.C. CODE ANN. § 65-2655 (1962) provides: "There shall be no other
remedy than those provided in this chapter in any case of the illegal or
wrongful (a) collection of taxes, (b) attempt to collect taxes .... .
6. Chesterfield County v. State Highway Dep't, 191 S.C. 19, 3 S.E.2d 686
(1939) ; Textile Hall Corp. v. Riddle, 207 S.C. 291, 35 S.E.2d 701 (1945).
7. 174 S.E2d 344 (S.C. 1970).
8. The year in which the gain was received becomes material because of
the statutory changes made after 1959 affecting capital gains and reporting of
income on the installment method. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 65-258(6), -286
(1962).
9. Hereinafter referred to as Mrs. Woodward.
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The deed and mortgage were delivered into escrow so that the
parties could later adjust the consideration to conform with the
acreage shown by an "accurate survey."' 0 The agreement further
stated that "the deed and mortgage may be held in escrow and
not recorded until necessary."' 1 The survey, showing the tract to
contain 414 acres, was completed in 1959. The results of 'this
survey were not accepted by Mrs. Woodward until 1960. Partly
because of the prolonged discussions relative to the shortage
in the acreage in the tract, the deed and mortgage were held in
escrow and were not recorded until 1961.
The Tax Commission made a deficiency assessment for income
taxes based upon the sale of the land and receipt of the gain in
the year 1959. The taxpayer, contending that the sale was not
completed and the gain not received until 1961, paid the taxes
under protest and brought suit to recover the amount paid.
12
The court held that the execution of the deed and mortgage
and their delivery into escrow clearly vested title to the land in
the grantee and that the sale was complete for income tax pur-
poses at that time. The only condition of the escrow was the
maling of an accurate survey, and this was for the sole purpose
of fixing the amount of consideration, since the exact acreage in
the tract was unknown.' 3  The fact that the parties did not
finally recognize the accuracy of the survey until after 1959
did not alter its binding effect.
The court also had to decide when the gain from the sale
should be recognized if the sale were complete in 1959. The
taxpayer contended that she received nothing of value in connec-
tion with the transaction until 1961 and therefore received no
taxable income until that time. The court said that taxable
income is earned and received "[w]hen all events have occurred
which fix its amount and determine the liability of the party
from whom it is forthcoming to pay."1 4 Although the deed and
mortgage were not recorded until 1961 and the purchase price
of the property was to be paid in installments in the future, the
liability of the parties became fixed in 1959, and the sale was
taxable in that year.
10. 174 S.E.2d at 345.
11. Id.
12. As provided in S.C. CODE AN . §§ 65-2661, -2662 (1962).
13. 174 S.E2d at 346,
14. Adams v. Burts, 245 S.C. 339, 346, 140 S.E2d 586, 590 (1965).
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TAXATION SuivEYED
M1-. LicmsE TAxEs - R.nsTsixtAcn PRmmumxs
In Southeastern Fire Insurance Co. v. SMou Carolina Taxe
Commission,"5 Southeastern, a South Carolina corporation, rein-
sured contracts of insurance issued by Emerald Fire and Cas-
ualty Insurance Co. The Tax Commission levied a two percent
tax on the reinsurance premiums collected by Southeastern on
the ground that they constituted a part of Southeastern's total
premium income as contemplated by the statute16 and therefore
were taxable. Southeastern paid the tax under protest and sued
to recover the amount so paid; Southeastern contended that the
premiums paid Southeastern by Emerald were not within the
scope of the statute17 because the contract was one of indemnity
and not one of insurance.
The taxing statute involved here taxes "total premiums ...
from insurance contracts ..."18; therefore, the question before
the court was whether this statute refers to insurance contracts
only, or to both insurance and reinsurance contracts. The court
said that, if the terms of the statute are susceptible of more than
one interpretation, they must be construed to give effect to the
intent of the legislature. "The legislature by failing to specify
that the taxing statute applies to reinsurance as well as insurance
may have been attempting to encourage reinsurance."19 The
court said that there is no question but that the state has received
two percent of the premiums which were paid by insured persons
to Emerald, and undoubtedly the legislature did not intend that
these persons should bear the brunt of another two percent
tax. 20
The court also noted that premiums paid for reinsurance by
a foreign corporation would not be subject to such tax and,
therefore, to hold South Carolina corporations as taxable on
15. 253 S.C. 407, 171 S.E2d 355 (1970).
16. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 37-1302 (1962) provides:
[T]here is hereby levied upon each domestic fire insurance
company, each domestic accident and health insurance company,
each domestic casualty or surety company and all other domestic
insurance companies of any class ... an additional and graded
license fee in an amount equal to tvo per cent of the total
premiums, that is, total premium income or total premium receipts
for insurance contracts ....
17. Id.
1M Id.
19. 253 S.C. at 411, 171 S.E2d at 356.
20. Although the tax is not levied against the insured individuals, it is
inescapable that the payment of taxes is a cost of doing business and must be
passed on to the policyholders.
1970]
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these premiums would indicate that the legislature intended to
discriminate against its own domestic corporations.
IV. LiCENsE TAxEs - REASONABLENESS
The City of Newberry enacted an ordinance in 1966 known as
the City of Newberry Business and Professional License Ordi-
nance under which enterprises doing business in the city were
required to obtain a license. The license was to be issued upon
payment of a tax based on the gross receipts of the business in
the previous year that were earned within the City of Newberry.
In United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. City of New-
berry,21 the plaintiff insurance company paid the required
amount to obtain the business license and brought an action for
its recovery on the theory that the tax imposed upon the com-
pany was "unjust, unreasonable, confiscatory, or excessive.1
22
The insurance company presented two arguments attacking
the ordinance. First, it contended that license tax charges for
other businesses, as compared to charges for fire and casualty
insurance companies, showed that in and of itself the charges for
the insurance companies were unreasonable. Rejecting this argu-
ment, the court stated, "The fact that one class may pay more
proportionately than other classes does not, of itself, make the
license fee unreasonable or arbitrary since this is largely within
the discretion of city council."2 3 The court said further, "In the
absence of positive evidence to the contrary, acts or ordinances
licensing or taxing an occupation or privilege are presumed to
be reasonable, and the courts will not interfere unless their
unreasonableness and oppressiveness is clearly apparent .... 112
Second, the insurance company argued that the license tax
was unreasonable because the company was losing money as
a property insurer. The court also rejected this argument and
upheld the ordinance; in so doing, the court decided that profits
and losses are not a proper consideration in determining reason-
able amounts to be charged for licenses, especially when the
taxpayer, as here, is regulated as to rates by a government agency
and may obtain an increase in rates upon a proper showing.-5
21. 253 S.C. 197, 169 S.E.2d 599 (1969).
22. Id. at 199, 169 S.E.2d at 600.
23. Great Atl. and Pac. Tea Co. v. City of Spartanburg, 170 S.C. 262, 170
S.E. 273 (1933); City of Columbia v. Putnam, 241 S.C. 195, 199, 127 S.E.2d
631, 633 (1962).
24. 53 C.J.S. Licenses § 16 (1948).
25. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-673, -683 (1962).
[Vol. 22
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TAXAioN SuRvEYE
V. ESTAT TAx - AL owABrx AIA=AL DEDUCTION
In White v. South Carolina Tax Commission26 the adminis-
trator of the estate of Benjamin F. Adams filed an estate tax
return wherein he deducted one-third of the adjusted gross
estate from the taxable estate as the marital deduction of the
widow. The Tax Commission determined that the amount of
the allowable marital deduction should be reduced to a value
equal to that calculated after the allowance for state and federal
estate taxes and imposed a deficiency assessment. The adminis-
trator paid this deficiency under protest and filed suit for
recovery of the amount so paid.
2 7
The court said that by the passage of the marital deduction
provisions28 Congress left the common law states where, if they
so desired, they could allow their citizens the full benefit of the
marital deduction provisions by casting, or not casting, the
burden of the tax upon property that would otherwise pass free
of tax to the surviving spouse. Therefore, the method used by
the Tax Commission for determining the allowable marital
deduction is correct only if the law of South Carolina imposes
the tax upon the widow's distributive share. In holding that the
law of this state does not impose such a tax on the share passing
to the widow, the court cited the rationale of the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit as expressed in Pitts V. Ham-
p.%k 29 in which the Internal Revenue Service took the identical
position of the Tax Commission here. The South Carolina
Supreme Court said, "Where the estate is to receive the benefit
of the deduction of the widow's share . . . it would be unfair
and unjust to require her share to bear any portion of the tax
.... 5,3o Further, there is no provision in the law of South
Carolina which requires such a result.
The court had previously held that assets not includible in
the taxable estate and which generate no part of the estate tax
should not be burdened with the payment of any portion of the
tax"1 ; this holding is strengthened by the result of the presently
surveyed case.
26. 253 S.C. 79, 169 S.E.2d 143 (1969).
27. Pursuant to S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 65-2661, -2662 (1962).
28. 26 U.S.C. § 2056 (b) (4) (1952).
29. 228 F2d 486 (4th Cir. 1955).
30. Id. at 490.
31. Myers v. Sinkler, 235 S.C. 162, 110 S.E2d 241 (1959).
1970]
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Another argument presented by the Commission was that, if
the widow were allowed to receive her one-third share free
from the estate tax, the children, after payment of the tax,
would each receive less net proceeds than the widow, and this
result would be in contravention of the Statute of Descent and
Distribution.32  The court, rejecting this argument, said that
the legislature saw fit to impose the tax on the distributive
shares passing to the children, but not to impose a tax upon the
distributive share passing to the widow.
W. Rn= EImzrm
32. S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-52 (1962).
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